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ABATEMENT OF SUIT-PENDENCY OF THE SAME CAUSE OF AcTION.-The plaintiff
sued the defendant in the county court for damages resulting from a collision
between their automobiles. The defendant brought suit in the municipal court,
which had concurrent jurisdiction with the county court, against the plaintiff for
damages to his automobile arising out of the same accident. The action in the
municipal court was tried first, and the defendant recovered damages. An
appeal was taken by the plaintiff ; he also brought a bill to restrain the further
prosecution of the municipal court suit on the ground that a prior action cover-
ing the same transaction between the same parties was pending in the county
court. Held, that the bill should be dismissed. Gilley v. Jarvis (192o, Vt.) iog
Atl. 41.
It is well settled that if a single "cause of action" is split up so as to be made
the "subject" of different actions, the pendency of the first may be pleaded in
the abatement of the other. Cahill v. Cahill (19o4) 76 Conn. 542, 57 At. 284.
But the ambiguity of the phrase "cause of action" has caused much confusion,
being sometimes used to denote the operative facts and at other times the ldgal
relations resulting therefrom. Cf. King v. Chicago, etc. Ry. (igoo) 8o Minn. 83,
82 N. W. 1113; cf. Watson v. Texas & Pac. Ry. (1894) 8 Tex. Civ. App. 144,
27 S. W. 924; see (igig) 28 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 421, note I. If "cause of
action" means the operative facts which create a right to damages, there could
be but a single cause of action under the facts of this case. But either party,
by making the proper allegations, had the power and privilege to bring a suit
and have it judicially determined whether his claimed right to damages existed.
Cf. Cade v. McFarland (1875) 48 Vt. 47. Employing "cause of action" to denote
such claim of a right made by either party, as did the court in the instant case,
it is clear that two "causes of action" arose out of the one transaction. Bell v.
Hansley (1855) 48 N. C. I31; contra, Allen v. Salley (1919, N. C.) ioi S. E. 545.
That the two are not identical is shown by the fact that in a suit by either, the
other could have filed a counterclaim which alleged a distinct "cause of action."
Furthermore, if no counterclaim was filed, a judgment for the defendant in either
suit would not necessarily constitute res judicata in the other. There is no
logical reason, apart from statute, why using a set of operative facts as a defence
should bar the use of the same set of facts elsewhere as the basis of an inde-
pendent action. Jones v. Witousek (igoi) 114 Iowa, 14, 86 N. W. 59; contra,
Watkins v. American Nat. Bank (19o5, D. Colo.) 134 Fed. 36; but cf. Uniform
Sales Act, sec. 69 (2). And if the injunction was allowed, the defendant would
have been deprived of his right, often created by statute, to have the action tried
in a given county. But statutes requiring a counterclaim which is triable together
with the chief suit, to be filed then or barred, produce the same result without
having worked any evident injustice. The court reached the only possible logical
conclusion. But it would seem that a legislative enactment requiring the con-
solidation of "cause of action;' in a single suit, as has been adopted in most
jurisdictions, would make for the attainment of justice with the least expense and
vexation to the litigators.
AGENCY-INsuRANcE-CoNsTuc'rvW NoTicE.-The plaintiff brought an action
of assumpsit on a policy of fire insurance issued by the defendant. The policy
contained a provision that "if the interest of the assured be other than uncon-
ditional and sole ownership" the policy should be void. The soliciting agent of
the general agent of the defendant had actual knowledge that the plaintiff was
not the unconditional and sole owner. Held, that the plaintiff should not recover,
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because actual notice to the soliciting agent was not constructive notice to the
defendant, and therefore the condition was not waived. Salvate v. Firemen's
Ins. Co. (192o, R. I.) io8 Atl. 579.
In the instant case the soliciting agent's actual knowledge was "constructive"
notice to the general agent, and binding as to him. And if the soliciting agent
was one whom the general agent was expressly or impliedly authorized to ap-
point, he is to be deemed the agent of the principal; and notice to such soliciting
agent would have the effect of notice to the principal. Merritt v. Huber (i9o8)
137 Iowa, 135, 114 N. W. 627; see Clover Crest S. Farm v. Wyoming Valley F.
Ins. Co. (gig, Sup. Ct.) 177 N. Y. Supp. 771, 775, io8 Misc. 465; contra, Williams
-v. Atlas Ass. Co. (1918, Ga. App.) 97 S. E. 91. In the principal case if the gen-
eral agent had actual notice, it would seeri that the court would have held the
defendant. Some courts would not make this distinction. See Bates v. American
Mortgage Co. (1891) 37 S. C. 88, IOI, 16 S. E. 883, 887. If under the circum-
stances the soliciting agent had apparent authority to waive the condition, the
principal should not be permitted to deny such power. See American Fire Ins.
Co. v. King Lumber & Mfg. Co. (1919) 39 Sup. Ct. 431, 250 U. . 2-. Otherwise,
the insured should of course acquire no additional right by the waiver. See
Vance, Law of Insurance (9o4) 321. The instant case can be justified on the
ground, that the accompanying circumstances would not indicate to a reasonably
prudent man that the soliciting agent (as opposed to the general agent) had such
authority. But see, on very similar facts, Carpenter v. German American Ins. Co.
(1892) 135 N. Y. 298, 31 N. E. 1015. The cases do not seem to have found
-difficulty with the parol evidence rule in admitting testimony of such oral agree-
ment to contradict provisions in insurance policies. It has been suggested that
such an oral agreement "may be without the purview of the written instrument."
4 Wigmore, Evidence (9o5) 3432. But it seems rather that this class of cases
is an arbitrary exception to the parol evidence rules, which has been felt rather
than examined.
ATTORNEY "AND CLIENT-EFFECT OF DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSIoN-PRosEcUTING
ATTORNEY NOT OUSTED FROM OFFICE BY SUSPENSION.-Missouri Rev. St. 1909,
section iooo, provides inter alia that at the biennial general election there shall
be elected in each county of the state "a prosecuting attorney, who shall be
a person learned in the law, duly licensed to practice as an attorney at law in
this state and enrolled as such." In a proceeding quo warranto brought by the
Attorney General to remove the respondent from his office as prosecuting at-
torney, it appeared that after he had been elected and qualified for a two year
term, he was suspended from the practice of law for a period of twelve months.
Held, that a demurrer to the information in quo warranto should be sustained.
State ex rel. McAllister, Atty. Getz. v. Sanderson (1919, Mo.) 217 S. W. 60.
This decision, which seems extraordinary, may possibly be sustained upon the
-theory that the respondent had appealed from the judgment of suspension and
that the appeal was still pending. Even this is questionable in view of the fact
that there has been no stay of the judgment of suspension. The court, however,
goes further and states that disbarment statutes are penal and are to be strictly
construed; that the requirement that a prosecuting attorney should be licensed
referred only to the time of election; and that the suspension from practice did
not prevent him from being considered "licensed." It is clear, however, that dis-
barment provisions are not to be treated as criminal proceedings but as proceed-
ings in the interest of the public welfare. Cf. Ex parte Brounsall (1778, K. B.)
2 Cowp. 829; cf. Bar Asso. of City of Boston v. Casey (1912) 211 Mass. 187,
97 N. E. 751. And it is generally held that where appearance in court is neces-
sary in the fulfillment of the duties of an office, suspension or disbarment is a
disqualification for the office. Danforth v. Egan (1909) 23 S. D. 43, ii9 N. W.
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lo1 ; Brown v. Woods (1895) 2 Okla. 6OI, 39 Pac. 473. Where a county attor-
ney was not required to be a lawyer, it has been held that disbarment did not
disqualify him from the public office. State v. Swan (1899) 6o Kan. 461, 56 Pac.
750. And this is the ordinary rule where the public office is not limited to mem-
bers of the bar. State v. Peck (1914) 88 Conn. 447, 9i Atl. 274. Obviously it
does not apply to the situation disclosed by the instant case. See cases collected
20 Ann. Cas. 4=, L. R. A. I915A 663.
BANKRUPTCY-FOREIGN CaR.rros.-In i899 the defendant delivered his note to,
the plaintiff in the province of Quebec where both parties resided. The note was
discounted at a local bank and in igoO, the bank obtained judgment thereon
against both parties. The plaintiff paid this judgment in io2 and then attempted
to enforce it against the defendant. The latter had emigrated to New Hampshire-
and in i9o6 had filed voluntary bankruptcy proceedings and obtained a discharge.
The debt in question was scheduled under the name of the bank, which had actual
notice of the proceedings but did not participate in them. Held, that the plain-
tiff's claim was barred by the discharge in bankruptcy. Morency v. Landry
(i919, N. H.) Io8 At. 855.
No other decision on this precise point under the present Bankruptcy Act has
been found. That it is beyond the power of state legislation to discharge by
insolvency proceedings the debts of foreign creditors who have not participated
in such proceedings is well settled, although whether the rule is based on consti-
tutional or jurisdictional grounds is not always clear. Baldwin v. Hale (1863,
U. S.) i Wall. 223; see (I893) 6 HARV. L. REV. 349. But that Congress may
make a discharge in bankruptcy effective throughout the United States as to
foreign creditors who thereafter bring suit in this country seems not to be ques-
tioned. The argument of the plaintiff did not deny the power of Congress, but
contended, as a matter of the proper construction of the act, that such power had
not been exercised. Under the act of x867 there was a conflict among state deci-
sions whether the discharge affected foreign creditors. McDougall v. Page (1882)
55 Vt. 187 (that it did not); contra, Pattison v. Wilbur (1873) io R. I. 448.
In the principal case the court cites sectiori 65d of the act as indicating that
foreign creditors have provable claims, and reasons that therefore they are em-
braced within the language of section i7, which provides for the discharge. This
construction is in harmony with one of the main purposes of the act, namely, to
give honest debtors a new start in business life. In accord with it are a few
lower federal court decisions under earlier statutes. See Loveland, Bankruptcy
(2d *ed. 1904) 756. It seems, however, that the discharge is only a local bar, and
would not be effective if suit were brought beyond the jurisdiction of the United
States. See Moore v. Horton (1884, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 32 Hun, 393; M'Millan v.
M'Neill (i81g, U. S.) 4 Wheat. 2o9.
BnLLS AND NOTES-ALTERATIoN-DETACHING NoTE FROM CONTRACr ALONG PER-
FoRAED Liu-s.-The defendant ordered a bill of goods from a salesman, and on
his representation to the defendant that the part of the order blank separated by
perforations was not a note, but merely a specification of the method of payment,
she signed it. The note was later torn off and indorsed to the plaintiff, who sued
to collect. In the contract above the perforations there was a printed authoriza-
tion to the payee to tear off the note. Held, that the plaintiff should not recover,
because there was fraud in the procurement of the signature, a material alteration,
and a failure of proof that the plaintiff was a holder in due course. Stevens v.
Barnes (igig, N. D.) 175 N. W. 7o9.
It is clear that cutting or tearing off a part of an instrument, so that its
character or operation is thereby changed, is a material alteration. Palmer v.
Largent (1876) 5 Neb. 223; Commercial Security Co. v. Hull (igig, Tex. Civ.
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App.).212 S. W. 986. But this does not avoid a negotiable note in favor of one
who has authorized the alteration. N. I. L. sec. 124. It has been held that the
signing of a note readily severable from a contract impliedly authorizes the payee
to detach and negotiate it. New Bank v. Kleiner (ioi) 112 Wis. 287, 87 N. W.
io9o; contra, Stephens v. Davis (I886) 85 Tenn. 271, 2 S. W. 382. Even an
express authorization in the contract, as in the principal case, is not binding
where the signature is obtained by fraudulent representations. Stevens v. Pear-
son (917) 138 Minn. 72, 163 N. W. 769. And where there is a parol agreement
that the note shall not be severed until performance of the contract, it avoids the
note entirely, as against the severer, to sever it before performance. Holds-worth
v. Blyth & Fargo Co. (1915) 23 Wyo. 52, 146 Pac. 6o3. However, under the
above section of the N. I. L. an altered note can be enforced according to its
original tenor by a holder in due course, not a party to the alteration, and the
mere fact that the edge of a note shows marks of having been attached to
another paper is not sufficient to put a taker on inquiry. Iowa City State Bank
v. Milford (1917, Tex. Civ. App.) 2oo S. W. 883; Landon v. Huston Drug Co,
(I916, Tex. Civ. App.) 190 S. W. 534 The applicability of the section would
seem to be conditioned on the existence of a negotiable note, as such, before
any alteration. But in the absence of express or implied authority to detach
the note-form, the whole paper can only be considered as one instrument,
usually a conditional contract of sale, the obligation on which is discharged by
the material alteration. See Anson, Contract (3d Am. ed. by Corbin, igig) 489.
Since the duty of the party who has promised to pay is thus discharged before
any part of the paper ever became operative as a negotiable instrument, the
transferee gets nothing by the purported negotiation. But the convenience of
having a note on the same sheet with a contract or order for which it is given is
manifest. Unless the perforations are obviously part of a design to defraud, it
would seem sound construction for the courts, ,even in the absence of such ex-
press authorization as was given in the instant case, to imply a privilege and
power in the payee to tear off the note-form and thereby to render it a negotiable.
instrument And even where such privilege is negatied by the contract, still the
same policy which protects bona fide holders in general should operate to give
the payee a power so to detach, wherever the maker signed the note-form with
due opportunity to know its nature.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-DEATH STATUTES-LAw GOVERNING DISTamUTIoN OF
DAMAGES REcovERD.--A resident of New York was fatally injured in Penn-
sylvania. The Pennsylvania death statute awards damages to the "husband,
widow, children, or parents of the deceased" and provides "that the sum so re-
covered shall go to them in the proportion they would take his or her personal
estate in case of intestacy." Under the Pennsylvania statute of distributions both
parents would take; under the New York statute of distributions the father
only. An action was brought under the Pennsylvania death statute. Held, that
the father alone was entitled to the damages as the sole domiciliary distributee.
Pennsylvania R. R. v. Levine (Jan. i4, 192o) C. C. A. 2d, Oct Term, 1919, No. 75.
The principal case, in accordance with the unanimous view, holds the death
statute of the locus delicti decisive as to the beneficiaries and their respective
shares. Re Coe (19o6) 13o Iowa, 3o7, io6 N. W. 743, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 814,
note. Sometimes this statute expressly refers to the local statute of distribu-
tions. Drone.anburg v. Harris (i9o8) io8 Md. 597, 71 AtL 81; Hartness v. Pharr
(1903) 133 N. C. 566, 45 S. E. goi. In the case of certain federal statutes the
actual course of intestate succession is indicated with equal clearness. Hutchin-
son Investment Co. v. Caldwell -(1894) 152 U. S. 65, 14 Sup. Ct. 504 ("heirs") ;
Blagge v. Balch (1896) 162 U. S. 439, 16 Sup. Ct. 853; but see Seaboard Air Line
R. R. v. Kenney (1916) 24o U. S. 489, 36 Sup. Ct. 458. The local scheme of
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distribution, rather than the domiciliary course of distribution, is sometimes
acceipted by the courts without consideration of the alternative construction.
Stangeland v. Minn. St. P. & S. S. M. R. R. (19o8) io5 Minn. 224, i7 N. W.
386; Whitley v. Spokane etc. R. R. (1913) 23 Ida. 642, 132 Pac. 121. In other
cases the actual, or domiciliary course of distribution has been expressly re-
jected, although in evident disregard of the ambiguity of construction involved.
Stoeckman v. Terre Haute etc. R. R. (1884) i5 Mo. App. 5o3; McDonald v'.
McDonald's Adm'rs (894) 96 Ky. 209, 28 S. W. 482; Bolinger v. Beachan
(igio) 8r Kan. 746, io6 Pac. Io94; Re Coe, supra. On the other hand the words
"shall be disposed of as personal property belonging to the estate of the deceased"
have been held to refer to the actual distribution as determined by the domi-
ciliary law, and not to the local scheme of distribution. Hartley v. Hartley
(i9o5) 7i Kan. 691, 8r Pac. 5o5. The opinion in the principal case proceeds
upon the assumption that the local statute of distributions is referred to, but in
reliance upon the provision of the latter excluding from its operation decedents
domiciled without the Commonwealth concludes that the domiciliary statute of
distributions is applicable. This provision, merely enacting as it does the pre-
vailing rule of conflict of laws applicable to intestate succession, seems irrele-
vant with respect to the construction of the death statute. The conclusion
reached, however, may be well defended, as against the prevailing view, by the
direct process of construction of the death statute itself, which by its terms ap-
pears to refer to the domiciliary course of intestate succession rather than to
the local statutory scheme of distribution.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-PvLEEs AND IMMUNITIES CL.usE-INcom TAX oN
RESIDENTS AND NoN-RxsmErTs.-The New York state income tax law which
taxed the net income of residents and that of non-residents derived from all their
property and every business or occupation in the state, granted certain exemp-
tions to resident taxpayers only. The complainant, a Connecticut corporation
doing business in New York and having employees residing out of the state but
occupied in the complainant's busifness in New York, brought a bill to restrain
the enforcement of the act. Held, that the injunction should be allowed. Travis
v. The Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. (i92o) 40 Sup. Ct. 228.
An Oklahoma statute, provided that every person in the state should be liable
for an annual tax on his entire income arising from all sources, and that a like
tax be levied upon the entire net income from all property owned and from every
business carried on in the state by non-residents. The act permitted residents to
deduct from their gross income losses sustained in and outside of the state, while
non-residents could deduct only those losses incurred in the state. The complain-
ant, a resident of Illinois, operating oil wells in Oklahoma, brought a bill to enjoin
the enforcement of this act. Held, that the bill should be dismissed. Shaffer v.
Carter (i92o) 40 Sup. Ct 2I.
In the second case the Court has apparently entirely receded from its former
unfortunate position that a tax on the income derived from property was the
legal equivalent of a direct tax.on the property from which the income was
derived. Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (1895) 157 U. S..429, 15 Sup. Ct.
673; see Seligman, The Income Tax (914) ch. 5. It correctly recognizes that
income taxation is directed at the privilege of creating and enjoying income;
and the power to levy the tax is based upon the protection which the person
receives in his enjoyment of it or in his conduct of the business which helps
create it. And since the taxation of non-residents for the privileges exercised
under the protection of the levying state has long been upheld in the form of
inheritance and occupation taxes, there would seem to be no doubt of the power
to tax non-residents as in the instant case. See Magoun v. Illinois etc. Bank
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(1898) 17o U. S. 283, I8 Sup. Ct. 594 (inheritence tax) ; see Emert v. Missouri
(1895) 156 U. S. 296, 311, 15 Sup. Ct. 367, 370 (occupation tax). Both of the
principal cases raised the question: to what privileges and immunities non-
residents are entitled, since a lower exemption was allowed to non-residents
than residents. Not every discrimination is void. See (1919) 28 YAIE LAw
JoumNA, 6oi. Yet it has been usually held that in matters of taxation no heavier
burden can be levied on non-residents than on residents for the privilege of
holding or enjoying property in the state. Ward v. Maryland (187o, U. S.) 12
Wall. 418; see (1919) 28 YALE. LAW JOURNAl, 824; see (ii8) 27 ibid., 845; but
see for. a distinct limitation (I92o) 29 ibid., 464. -Thus an act exempting only
residents from inheritance taxes is void. Mahoney's Estate (19O) 133 Calif. i8o,
65 Pac. 389. And so the New York statute was in the first instant case held
invalid, since it clearly resulted in an undue advantage in favor of residents.
And a tax statute allowing residents a deduction of all their debts from the
appraised value of their personal property, and non-residents a deduction of only
those debts contracted by reason of business transacted in the state, has been
held unconstitutional. Sprague v. Fletcher (1896) 69 Vt. 69, 37 Atl. 239. But it
is submitted that the Oklahoma statute, with an analogous provision, was cor-
rectly sustained in the second instant case. The classification was reason-
able since the tax was on the privilege of doing business and using the income
derived therefrom, and the amount of the tax should approximate the value of
protection given.
CONTRACTS-PAST CONSIDERATIoN-SERvIcEs RsaNDme.-The decedent in a
written instrument assumed to pay certain debts of his servant, the plaintiff,
"in consideration of faithful service rendered for a long term of years and
other valuable consideration." The first executor made several payments on
this claim, but after his resignation his successor refused to pay the balance due,
and proceedings were begun in the chancery court to enforce the payment of
the balance. Held, that the plaintiff should recover. Brickell v. Hendricks
(192o, Miss.) 83 So. 6og.
It is generally stated that past consideration is not sufficient to support a sub-
sequent promise. Barker v. Thayer (1914) 217 Mass. 13, io4 N. E. 572; Shepard
v. Rhodes (1863) 7 R. I. 470. There are, however, several exceptions to this
rule. See Anson, Contract (3d Am. ed. by Corbin, 1919) secs. 149-151. One of
these exceptions is that past consideration will support a subsequent promise, if
the consideration was given at the request of the promisor. Lampleigh v. Brath-
wait (1615, K. B.) Hob. io5; Winefield v. Feder (1912) I69 IIl. App. 48o; contra,
cf. Conant v. Evans (igog) 2o2 Mass. 34, 88 N. E. 438. The modern courts which
follow this exception say that there must be, in addition to the request, an im-
plied promise of compensation. -Neal & Son v. Stanley (I916) 17 Ga. App. 502,
87 S. E. 718; Moore v. Elmer (igoi) i8o Mass. I5, 61 N. E. 259. It has also
been held that a continuance of the services pursuant to a request is sufficient
consideration for a promise to pay for services rendered prior to the request.
Blackwell v. Kercheval (1915) 27 Ida. 537, 149 Pac. xo6o. The great weight of
authority is that the rendition of services without expectation of payment there-
for is not a sufficient consideration to support a subsequent promise. Harper v.
Davis (1911) 115 Md. 349, 8o. At. 12; Kregel v. Fredelake (1918, I6wa) 169
N. W. 642. Two decisions accord with the instant case, and attempt a justifica-
tion by calling the promise a "payment" and not a "gratuity." In re Simmons
(igo5, Surr. Ct.) 48 Misc. 484, 96 N. Y. Supp. iO3; Yarwood v. Trusts and
Guarantee Co. (19o4, Sup. Ct.) 94 App. Div. 47, 87 N. Y. Supp. 947. The prom-
ises in those and the instant case are clearly gratuities and the decisions are
apparently not in harmony with the great weight of authority. The decision in
the instant case places, in effect, the English and American doctrine of considera-
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tion on the same level as the civil-law doctrine of causa. See Lorenzen, Causa
and Consideration in the Law of Contracts (igig) 28 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 621,
633; cf. Henry, Consideration in Contracts-6oi A. D. to i52o A. D. (1917) 26
ibid., 664. The court in the instant case carried out the intention of the decedent.
and it might be perhaps good public policy, but it is clearly an extension of the
rules of consideration as hitherto expounded by the courts.
CRIMINAL LAW-FALSE PRETENSES-OBTAINING SOMETHING OF VALUE.-One
Martin held mortgages on the land of Higgins, only one of which was recorded.
By 1918 Higgins had paid off more than what was due on the recorded mortgage.
In April, 1918, Higgins mortgaged to Moose, a third party, and the instrument
was recorded. In June, 1918, by telling Martin the land was subject to no lien
but his, Higgins induced him to release all previous mortgages and take a new
one to cover the balance owing. Higgins was convicted under the false pretenses
statute. Held, that such conviction was error, because Martin's lien was subject
to the subsequent recorded mortgage of Moose in any event, and therefore
Martin parted with nothing of value. Higgins v. State (1920, Ark.) 217
S. W. 8o9.
To make out this crime, the first requisite operative fact is the false pretense
as to an existing fact. Spriggs v. Craig (1917) 36 N. D. 16o, 161 N. W.
1OO7. The next operative fact is the state of mind of the accused: a knowl-
edge that the pretense is false and an intention to defraud someone. State
v. Sherman (1918) 183 Iowa, 42, 166 N. W. 674; State v. Chambers (917)
179 Iowa, 436, 161 N. W. 47o. Then there must be a certain state of mind
in the deceived person: at least a partial reliance on the false pretense and
an intention to give absolutely possession and title, or possession and the
power to divest title. See Oppenheimer v. Fraser [19o7] 2 K. B. 50, 72; see
Pollock and Wright, Possession (I888) 219. Finally he must actually part
with something of value. While originally the "something of value" had to
be a subject of larceny at common law, as a result of statutes the term now
may usually be taken in the coll6quial sense, and includes most beneficial legal
relations. Cf. (1419) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 704. In the instant case, in fact,
the statute included any "right of action." An earlier case on. substantially
similar facts held that the privilege of suing on a note and mortgage void for
usury was such a right of action. Judkins v. State (1916) 123 Ark. 28, 184 S. W:
4o7. The court in. the instant case attempts to distinguish this, but it is hard to
see the difference between the above privilege and the privilege of suing to
foreclose an unrecorded mortgage ahead of a subsequent one duly recorded.
Both or neither are within the statute, and it is submitted that the instant case
is a discreet and sound overruling of the Judkins case. It should be noted that
with this extension of the meaning of value, the extreme commercial view of
the present day has not been reached, the view -illustrated in the case of notes
given or indorsed, or goods sold or pledged, for an antecedent debt. The only
value there seems to be the loss, in fact, of opportunity actively to enforce the
collection of the debt, a loss which includes no extinguishment of any legal rela-
tion. Such a loss Martin suffered in the instant case, but the-mercantile policy
which demands the extension of the meaning of value for the protection of bona
fide purchasers, seems not to demand a similar extension to secure a conviction
of false pretenses.
DEFEDS-BLANKS-NAME OF GRANTEE--AuTHORITy TO COMPLErE.-A executed
a lease of his land to W for ten years to explore for oil. In the event, of failure
to drill a well, W was to pay a small annual rent. The name of the lessee and
the amount of the rent was left blank W recorded the lease. A then leased a
part of the same land to X, and later leased the entire land to Y. Both of these
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leases were recorded. W paid the rent for the first year and then started to drill
a well. A, X, and Y, filed a petition for an injunction to restrain W. Thereupon
W inserted both his name and the rental value in the lease. Held, that the in-
junction should be granted, because the lease was insufficient against X and Y,
but as against A the lease was valid, there being implied authority to fill in the
blanks. Root v. Townsend (i919, Ky.) 215 S. W. 936.
The lease in the instant case required a deed. See 18 R. C. L. 12o6; see Ky.
St. 1915, secs. 490, 494. The general -rule is that a deed in blank is invalid.
Markham v. Gonaston (1598) Cro. Eliz. 626; Burgis v. Constantine [i9o8] 2
K. B. Div. 484; Allen v. Withrow (1884) 110 U. S. 119, 3 Sup. Ct. 517; Macurda
v. Fuller (1916) 225 Mass. 341, 114 N. E. 366. But if the grantee under such a
deed takes possession and either exercises privileges and rights of ownership
or pays the consideration, he acquires good title against his grantor. Frayer v.
Holton (1898) 8 Kan. App. 718, 54 Pac. 918; Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt (1877,
Sup. Ct. N. Y.) 54 How. Prac. 250. Where there is power to do so, the filling
up of the blanks after delivery will make the deed valid as from the date when
filled in. Hudson v. Revett (1829, Eng. C. P.) 5 Bing. 368; Bishop of Crediton
v. Bishop of Exeter [igo5] 2 Ch. 455. One line of cases holds that authority to
fill such blanks must be in writing. Lund sf. Thackery (19o4) 18 S. D. 113, 99
N. W. 856; see COMMENT (190) 8 CALIF. L. REv. 121. Another holds that
parol authority is sufficient. Swartz v. Ballou (1877) 47 Iowa, 188; Drury v.
Foster (1864, U. S.) 2 Wall. 24, 33. A third holds that the delivery of a deed
with blanks itself implies authority to fill the blanks and make the deed valid.
Creveling v. Banta (908) 138 Iowa, 47, 55, 115 N. W. 598; Board of Education
of Minneapolis v. Hughes (1912) 118 Minn. 404, 136 N. W. io95. This is the
rule applied to blanks in commercial paper. See Brannan, Negotiable Instru-
ments Law (3d ed. 1920) sec. 14. Some jurisdictions draw a distinction between
filling of blanks in sealed and unsealed instruments. See Jewell v. Rock River
Paper Co. (I88I) 101 Ill. 57; Donason v. Barbero (1907) 230 Ill. 138, 82 N. E.
620. What seems to be the better view disregards this distinction. Friend v.
Yahr (i9o5) I26 Wis. 291, 1o4 N. W. 997. in the instant case the recording of
a deed of lease that was invalid to convey title can have no effect to give notice.
Devlin, Deeds (3d ed. 1911) sec. 649. And the court properly decided that a
recorded conveyance prior to the filling of the blanks defeated the first deed.
Cf. Board of Education of Minneapolis v. Hughes (1912) 118 Minn. 404, 136
N. W. lo95.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-JOINT CRIMES-NO PRESUMPION OF ComicloN BY Hus-
BAND.-The defendant was indicted for selling intoxicating liquor without a
license. A request to instruct the jury that if they believed from the evidence
that the defendant acted jointly with her husband in selling the liquor, or sold
the liquor in his presence, the law presumed that she acted under his coercion,
and they should find her not guilty, was refused. Held, that such refusal 
was
proper, since the presumption of' coercion no longer exists. King v. City of
Owensboro (92o, Ky.) 218 S. W. 297.
It was well settled at common law that where certain crimes were committed
by a married woman in the presence.of her husband, there was a presumption
that she was not criminally liable, and that she acted under his coercion. Coln-
monwealth v. Neal (1813) io Mass. 152; State v. Cleaves (1871) 59 Me. 298.
And it has been held that the "married women's acts" have in nowise changed
or modified this presumption. Commonwealth v. Gannon (1867) 97 Mass. 547.
But the presumption has lost much of its force in consequence of the diminished
power of control which by law and usage husbands now have over the persons
and property of their wives. See Commonwealth v. Hill (1887) 145 Mass. 305,
307, 14 N. E. 124, 127. For this reason some courts have evaded the 
common-
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law rule wherever possible. But, on the other hand, it has been held, in accord
with the principal case, that this presumption no longer holds at all. State v.
Seahorn (1914) 166 N. C. 373, 8i S. E. 687; State v. Hendricks (1884) 32 Kan.
559, 4 Pac. io5o. It is suggested that this liberal view is sound and in accord
with the mores of the times.
INTERSTATE "COMMERcE-LIMITATION OF LIABILITY-PASSENER RIDING ON
PAss.-The plaintiff sued for damages resulting from injuries received while
riding in the defendant's train. He had an employee's pass thereon from Toledo
to Cleveland, which limited the defendant's "liability" for negligence. Desiring
to go to Pittsburgh, he obtained a pass by way of Ashtabula to Youngstown, and
the promise of a pass from Youngstown to Pittsburgh. But to save time, he
used his own pass from Toledo to Cleveland, intending to pay his way on the
Erie railroad from Cleveland to Youngstown, there get the promised pass, and
go on to Pittsburgh. He was injured en route from Toledo to Cleveland. The
plaintiff contended that he was an interstate passenger and that the limitation of
"liability" in the pass was inoperative by federal law. Held, that he should
recover, because the defendant was wantonly negligent, with a dictum that he was
not an interstate passenger. New York Central R. R. Co. v. Mohney (1920)
40 Sup. Ct. 287.
Mere intent to export or leave the state does not place an article or person in
interstate commerce. United States v. Knight Co. (1894) i56 U. S. I, 15 Sup.
Ct 249. Actual motion in transportation seems to be essential. Bennett v.
American Express Co. (i89i) 83 Me. 236, 22 Atl. 159. Transportation to a mere
entre-pot, where the owner still retains control, is not enough. Cf. Coe v. Errol
(I885) ii6 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475; contra, cf. Texas & New Orleans R. R.
Co. v. Sdbine Tram Co. (i9oi) 227 U. S. III, 33 Sup. Ct. -29. The original strict
rule required a consignment to a carrier for a final or continuous movement.
Coe v. Errol, sup ra; cf. (i919) 28 YALE LAW JOURwAL, 528 ff. But it was early
decided that the fact that several independent carriers engaged in the transpor-
tation was irrelevant. The Daniel Ball (187o, U. S.) io Wall. 557; see New
York ex rel. Pa. Ry. v. Knight (19o4) 192 U. S. 21, 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 202, 204. And
a delay in transit does not necessarily operate to remove the interstate character.
State v. San Antonio R. (1903) 32 Tex. Civ. App. 58, 73 S. W. 572; cf. Mer-
chant's Transfer Co. v. Board of Reziew of City of Des Moines (1905) 128
Iowa, 732, io5 N. W. 211 (unreasonable delay). Some cases'have been controlled
entirely by the contract of shipment. Gulf, Colorado & Sante Fe Ry. v. Texas
(i9o7) 204 U. S. 403, 27 Sup. Ct. 36o. Nevertheless, customary use or conduct
which seems almost relevant, is disregarded. Norfolk & Western R. R. v. Com-
mnonwealth of Virginia (I896) 93 Va. 749, 24 S. E. 837. It is submitted that the
unconscious test is some motion while ready for final transportation, with an
intention to complete an interstate shipment or journey. The courts are gradu-
ally recognizing that the actual intent of the shipper or passenger should control.
Cf. Kelley v. Rhoads (1902) 188 U. S. I, 23 Sup. Ct. 259; see Western Union V.
Foster (1918) 247 U. S. 105, 113, 38 Sup. Ct. 438, 439. And any attempt to retain
the continuous journey, or final movement, test would be inconsistent with the
cases above.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-EMBLEMENTS-PROOF OF CusTo.-One Doom rented
a farm to the plaintiffs for a term of one year ending January I, 1918. The
plaintiffs planted a part of the farm in cotton, but were unable to pick all the
cotton before the expiration of this lease. In February i918, one of the plaintiffs
was still on the place and the defendant, to whom Doom had sold the farm some
months before, agreed to allow him a reasonable time for the removal of the
cotton still unpicked. The plaintiffs failed to-pick the cotton and in March the
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defendant entered and picked it himself. The plaintiffs sued for the value of
the cotton taken. The lower court instructed the jury that the plaintiffs were
entitled to a reasonable time after the expiration of their lease to remove the
unpicked cotton. No proof was offered of a custom between landlords and ten-
ants giving tenants this privilege. Held, that such instruction was erroneous.
Huckaby v. Walker (192o, Ark.) 217 S. W. 481.
A tenant for a fixed term of years at common law is not entitled to emble-
ments for the reason that it is the tenant's own folly to sow when he knows
that his lease will expire before the time of harvest. Gossett v. Drydale (X892)
48 Mo, App. 43o; see 2 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant (1912) 1636. But this
rule may be modified by the terms of the lease. Stoddard v. Waters (1875) 3o
Ark. 156. Or the landlord, by conduct misleading to the tenant, may be estopped
in equity from claiming the crop. Carmine v. Bowen (i9o6) io4 Md. 198, 64 At.
932. Or the rule may be modified by the custom of a particular locality. Wig-
gleiworth v. Dallison (1779, K. B.) i Doug. 2Ol. However, such a custom does
not prevail in opposition to express stipulations in the lease. Boraston. v. Green
(1812, K. B.) 16 East, 71. In some jurisdictions such a custom is recognized
as common to the whole state. Stultz v. Dickey (1812, Pa.) 5 Binn. 285.
Varying customs have led to apparent inconsistencies in the law. Cf. Tent-
pleman v. Biddle (1835, Del.) i Har. 522 (tenant entitled to remove wheat
crop, but not a crop of oats). It has been held that a custom cannot be
recognized since it must be immemorial and that this is not possible in the
United States. Harris vi. Carson (1836, Va.) 7 Leigh, 632. Some courts
put a crop matured and ready for severance in the same class with a crop
severed, but not yet removed, Oppernidn z. Littlejohn (I9IO) 98 Miss. 636, 54
So. 77. According to this view unpicked cotton does not .fall within the rules
as to emblements, if ripe at expiration of the lease period. Other cases treat
the cotton as an emblement as l6ng as unsevered. Sanders v. Ellington (1877)
77 N. C. 255. There is a similar conflict in the turpentine cases. Cf. Lewis v.
McNatt (1871) 65 N. C. 63 ("scrape" belongs to the tenant) ; cf. Florala Saw-
mill Co. v. Parrish (I9o8) 155 Ala. 462, 46 So. 461 ("scrape" belongs to the
landlord). The principal case follows what appears to be the majority rule in
treating matured, unpicked cotton as an emblement, and in saying that it goes to
the tenant where a custom has been proved in his favor.
LiMITATIoN OF ACTIONs-ToLLING STATUTE-JoINT OBLIGORS-PAYMENTS BY
PERSONAL REPiSENTATIVES.-The defendant signed a note as surety co-maker
for one Aday, who died intestate. A judgment of allowance was rendered in
favor of the plaintiff, who held the note, for the amount thereof, and a part
payment was made by Aday's administrator. The plaintiff later sued the de-
fendant for the residue, and he pleaded the statute of limitations. The plaintiff
contended that the part payment by the administrator had tolled the running of
the statute against the defendant. Held, that the plaintiff should recover. Find-
ley v. Shults (192o, Ark.) 218 S. W. 197.
The early common-law rule was that part payment by one joint obligor tolled
the statute for all. Whitcomb vi. Whiting (1781, K. B.) 2 Doug. 652. This rule
has been only slightly modified in England. Cf. Wyatt vi. Hodson (x832, Eng.
C. P.) 8 Bing. 309. But it has been abandoned in all but five of our jurisdictions.
See (1912) 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 272, note. Arkansas is one of those. Hicks
v. Lusk (1858) xg Ark. 692. The rule has been defended on the theory of
agency, and on the analogy of partnership, both of which are inconsistent with
other rules on joint obligors, such as that requiring presentment to each on a
loose notion that a payment which benefited all should burden all; and for the
practical reason that a change in the old rule would be embarrassing. But a
failure to change it by statute seems generally the result of oversight, Most
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jurisdictions give the personal representative power to toll the statute as against
the estate of the deceased by making a payment under order of the court.
Grimball v. Mastin (1884) 77 Ala. 553; Perry v. Horack (igoi) 63 Kan. 88, 64
Pac. 990. They thus give him what power the decedent had. But so far as the
note in the instant case is joint, it survived wholly at law to the survivors, so
that the executor's action cannot well be held to have affected them; so far as
the note is several, even the ancient rule, supra, would seem to have no basis
for application.
NEGLIGENE-REs IPSA LOQUITUR-BURDEN OF PRooF.-In an action for per-
sonal injuries the plaintiff proved that in a collision on the defendant railway he
was thrown from his seat and badly hurt. The jury found that the defendant
engineer had used ordinary care in attempting to stop the train, and might have
succeeded if the rails had not been coated with frost and if a strong wind had
not blown the sand away. Although the railway company showed proper inspec-
tion of the train and road-bed, and no other cause of the accident was sug-
gested, the jury found against the railway company, presumably for want of the
required high degree of care. Held, that the verdict was justifiable, for the
defendant had not merely the burden of showing that the facts were as con-
sistent with care on its part as with negligence, but also the burden of exculpat-
ing itself from the presumption raised by the prima facie case. Arnett v. Illinois
Central Ry. (ig2o, Iowa) 176 N. W. 32
It is elementary that ordinarily the plaintiff has the burden of proof, in the
sense of the risk of non-persuasion, with reference to the affirmative allega-
tions of his complaint, and personal injury actions are no exception. This
burden never shifts during the trial. See 4 Wigmore, Evidence (19o5) sec. 2485.
But where res ipsa loquitur is applied, a typical charge is that if the plaintiff
has made his prima facie case, the burden is then shifted to the defendant to
prove it was not negligent. See Pershing v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. (1887) 7r
Iowa, 56I, 564, 32 N. W. 488. The "technical" incorrectness of this statement
has been generally recognized when the attention of the court is called to it.
See Furnish v. Missouri Pacific Ry. (i8go) io2 Mo. 438, 453, 13 S. W. 1044, io48.
But some courts seem unwilling to base a reversal on this charge. Carroll v.
Boston Elevated Ry. (igog) 2oo Mass. 527, 86 N. E. 793; Cody v. Market St. Ry.
(19o5) 148 Calif. 9, 82 Pac. 666. The resulting confusion is seen when two
divisions of the same court reach opposite results, relying on the same case.
Clark v. Chicago & A. R. R. (1895) I7 Mo. 197, 29 S. W. 1O13; Schaefer v.
St. Louis & Sub. Ry. (1895) 128 Mo. 64, 30 S. W. 331, citing Furnish v. Ry.i
supra. This inaccuracy of terminology and thought has had its result in some
states, where it is now held that the defendant in such cases has the burden of
proving want of negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. Robinson v.
St. Louis & Sub. Ry. (19o3) lO3 Mo. App. 110, 77 S. W. 493; Sultivrnt v.
Charleston & W. C. Ry. (910) 85 S. C. 532, 67 S. E. 905; Weber v. Chicago,
R. L & P. R. R. (915) 175. Iowa, 358, I51 N. W. 852. But the majority of
states have consistently held the above typical charge prejudicial error. Kay v.
Metropolitan St. Ry. (igoo) 163 N. Y. 447, 57 N. E. 751 ; E.lgin, A. & S. Tr. Co.
v. Henchl (i9o7) 132 Il1. App. 535; see (917) 26 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 419.
Under this rule the burden of proof on the issue of negligence is never on the
defendant. Sweeney 7,. Erving (1913) 228 U. S. 233, 33 Sup. Ct. 416; Hughes v.
Atlantic C. & S. R. R. (914) 85 N. J. L. 212, 89 AtI. 769; see I6 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 527,-note; see L. R. A. I9i6A 930, note. The sound view is still that
the application of res ipsa loquitur merely means that the circumstances, in the
absence of explanation, afford reasonable evidence that the damage occurred be-
cause of the defendant's negligence. See Scott v. London, Dock Co. (1865, Exch.
Ch.) 3 H. & C. 596, 6oi. The principal case, therefore, in changing the operative
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facts to be proved to make out a cause of action, presents a new rule of sub-
stantive law, and puts accidents on carriers in a different class from other acci-
dents where the maxim is applicable. It is quite possible that this result is
justified by public policy, but the reasoning and terminology used in reaching it
are open to serious criticism.
PLEADING--MISJOINDER OF MASTER AND SERVANT AS PAIR~Es DEFENDANT-FED-
ERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILrrY AcTA railway employee sued the company and its
engineer jointly for personal injuries. The plaintiff's theory of recovery against
the engineer was based on a common-law right, while recovery was sought
against the company under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The state
court held that there was a fatal misjoinder. The plaintiff secured a writ of
certiorari. Held, that the refusal to permit the joinder in the state court, did not
violate any right conferred by federal law. Lee v. Central of Georgia Ry.
(1920) 40 Sup. Ct. 254.
An action brought in a state court by a resident plaintiff against a resident and
a non-resident defendant cannot be removed to a federal court on grounds of
diversity of citizenship, where both defendants are proper parties to the action.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Dixon (igoo) 179 U. S. 131, 21 Sup. Ct. 67; Dough-
erty v. Yazoo & M. V. Ry. (i9o3, C. C. A. 5th) 1i2 Fed. 2o5. The decisions of
the federal courts are not in accord as to whether or not a master and his negli-
gent servant are proper parties defendant, but as far as the question of removal
is concerned such joinder is proper. Alabama G. S. Ry. v. Thompson (i9o6)
200 U. S. 2o6, 26 Sup. Ct. 161; Southern Ry. v. Miller (igio) 217 U. S. 209, 30
Sup. Ct. 45o. But by express provision, no action based on the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act can be removed upon the ground of diverse citizenship.
Eng v. Southern Pac. Ry. (1913, D. Ore.) 21o Fed. 92; Kansas City So. Ry. v.
Leslie (1915) 238 U. S. 599, 35 Sup. Ct. 844. As the only question which was
before the Supreme Court in the instant case was one of state court procedure,
its decision is obviously correct, but the soundness of the state court decision is
questionable. A master is "liable" with his servant for an injury caused by the
servant at his express direction. Hewett v. Swift (1862) 85 Mass. 420; Brokaw
v. New Jersey Ry. (1867, Sup. Ct.) 32 N. J. L. 328. By a preponderance of
authority a joinder of master and servant is allowed, although the master's lia-
bility be based solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Able v. Southern Ry.
(i9o6) 73 S. C. 173, 52 S. E. 962; Whalen v. Pennsylvania R. R. (i9o6, Sup. Ct.)
73 N. J. L. 192, 63 AtI. 993; contra, Parsons v. Winchell (1850) 59 Mass. 592;
Western Union v. Olsson (i9o7) 4a Colo. 264, 9o Pac. 841. Likewise where the
liability of the master is imposed by statute. Rogers v. Ponet (1913) 21 Calif.
App. 577, 132 Pac. 851; Doyle v. St. Paul Union Depot Co. (iri6) 134 Minn.
461, i59 N. W. i8i; contra, Thompson v. Cincinnati I. 0. & T. P. Ry. (1915)
165 Ky. 256, 176 S. W. ioo6. The fact that the different theories of recovery
may require different measures of damages is not an insurmountable obstacle
to a joinder, for exemplary damages have been allowed against one defendant
while only compensatory damages were allowed against the other defendants.
Rauma v. Lamont (igoi) 82 Minn. 477, 85 N. W. 236; Mauk v. Brundage (19o3)
68 Ohio, 89, 67 N. E. 152. Since an injured third party may prosecute to judg-
ment either the master, the negligent servant, or even both separately according
to the majority American view, it is submitted that the liability of master and
servant is essentially joint, regardless of whether the theory of recovery against
the master is based on the common law or upon a statute; and that the chances
of securing practical justice will be increased by allowing a joinder, as it will
avoid a multiplicity of suits and facilitate the task of proving a cause of action.
PROPERTY-ADvERSE PosSEssIoN-DEcREE OF OUSTER.-The plaintiff brought an
action of trespass to try her "title," which she alleged was obtained by the
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adverse possession of her grantors and herself for the statutory period. During
this statutory period a decree of ouster had been issued against the plaintiff's
grantors, but actual possession had not been taken under the decree. Held, that
the plaintiff had acquired no title, because the decree of ouster had interrupted
the running of the statute and she could not tack the time of her grantor's pos-
session prior to the decree. Conn v. Houston Oil Co. (I920, Tex. Civ App.) 218
S. W. 137.
Persons claiming by adverse possession can tack the time of their possession
to the period of possession of those under whom they claim and from whom
they derive their interest. See Christian v. Bulbeck (1916) i20 Va. 74, io2, 90
S. E. 661, 669. The only thing necessary to tack periods of adverse possession is
"privity of possession" and exists whenever one holds the property under, or
for another. Vanderbilt v. Chapman (1916) 172 N. C. 809, go S. E. 993. The
running of the statute of limitations is interrupted by an action to quiet title, and
adverse possession cannot be based upon possession for the statutory period if
during such time a judgment was rendered against the person adverse to his
title. Perry v. Eagle Coal Co. (1916) 17o Ky. 824, 186 S. W. 875; contra, Forbes
v: Caldwell (1888) 39 Kan. 14, 17 Pac. 478. The continuity of adverse possession
is broken by a decree requiring the occupant to convey the land, even if the actual
possession is not disturbed. The decree has the effect of a voluntary conveyance.
Cower v. Quinlan (1879) 40 Mich. 572. But an adverse possessor is not ousted
merely by an action of ejectment brought against him. Langford v. Poppe
(i88o) 56 Calif. 73. And some courts hold that in order to interrupt the running
of the statute in favor of the adverse possessor he must be actually deprived of
possession. See Bressler v. Powder River Gold Dredging Co. (igig, Ore.) i78
Pac. 237, 239; Milwee v. Waddleton (I916, C. C. A. 9th) 233 Fed. 989. The
apparent conflict can be explained by the theories upon which the courts proceed.
Courts that base adverse possession upon demerit in the owner will ordinarily
require actual taking of possession to interrupt the running of the statute; while
courts that presume a grant to the holder of actual possession will hold that a
decree adverse to that presumed grant stops the statute. The principal case seems
to follow the latter theory, and if so, is logically sound. For a discussion of what
constitutes adverse possession, see (IgII) 20 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 226; (1913)
22 ibid., 256.
RELEAsE-FRA UD--REscissio-RAsoNABLE TImE.-The plaintiff, an illiterate,
signed a release of a claim against the defendant insurance company, believing
at the time that it was merely a receipt for the amount received on account to
date He discovered the mistake soon after, but neglected to bring an action on
the original claim until two years later. Held, that he should not recover. Kilgo
v. Continental Casualty Co. (igig, Ark.) 215 S. W. 689. McCulloch, C. J. and
Humphreys, J., diswenting. (i920, Ark.) 28 S. W. i71.
The dissenting opinion points out that since the majority admitted that a tender
of the consideration received for the release was not a condition precedent to a
right of action on the original claim, the release was void, not voidable. This
conclusion, however, does not necessarily follow. See (192o) 29 YA.ix LAW
JoURNAL., 688. Nevertheless, it would seem that the conclusion itself is sound.
Malkmus v. St. Louis Portland Cement Co. (igio) i5o Mo. App. 446, 131 S. W.
148; Cleary v. Municipal Electric Light Co. (1892) 65 Hun, 21, ig N. Y. Supp.
951; see 2 Black, Rescission and Cancellation (i916) sec. 396. The release would
therefore be wholly inoperative and should not affect the plaintiff's right of
action in any way. See Anson, Contract (3d Am. ed. by Corbin, igig) sec. 184.
Assuming, however, that the release was merely voidable, it is at least question-
able whether the court should find as a matter of law that by mere lapse of time
the plaintiff had affirmed the release. The court here would seem to require that
to avoid the lapse of the power of rescission by "conclusive presumption" that
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objection is "waived," the power must be exercised very shortly after discovery
of the facts. See Grymes v. Sanders (1876) 93 U. S. 55, 62; see Fitzhugh v.
Davis (1885) 46 Ark. 337, 348. This view has been defended. See Ewart,
Waiver Distributed (1917) 1O8. On the other hand, it has been urged that
mere inaction on the part of the defrauded party was only evidence tending to
show acquiescence. See Anson, op. cit., 259. It is submitted that this is the
sounder view.
TAXATION-INHERITANCE TAx-DEvisE PURSUANT TO CONTRAcr.-The testatrix
devised real estate to the plaintiffs pursuant to contract, the consideration being
the plaintiffs' promise to support her for the rest of her life. After the testa-
trix's death the plaintiffs refused to pay the inheritance tax on the devise, peti-
tioning that the executor be compelled to pay it out of the assets of the estate.
The executor petitioned for authority to sell the devised real estate for the
payment of the tax. Held, that the executor's petition be granted. Richardson
v. Lane (1920, Mass.) 126 N. E. 44.
Where property is conveyed in consideration of the support of the grantor
during his life, if it passes in possession and enjoyment as of the date of the
conveyance, it is not subject to the inheritance tax. Lamb v. Morrow (igo8)
i4o Iowa, 89, 117 N. W. III. This is implied from the wording of the con-
trolling statutes. See Matter of Green (1897) 153 N. Y. 223, 227, 47 N. E. 292,
293. If possession and enjoyment is not to take effect until after the grantor's
death the tax may be imposed. Matter of Brandreth (19o2) 169 N. Y. 437, 6z
N. E. 563; People Z. Estate of Moir (1904) 2o7 Ill. i8o, 69 N. E. 9o5. A devise
by will comes under the latter rule. In the instant case, although there was a
contract to devise, yet the property actually passed by the will. State v. Mollier
(1915) 96 Kan. 514, 152 Pac. 771; Matter of Gould (1898) 156 N. Y. 423, 51
N. E. 287. The state inheritance taxes are in the main computed on the value
of each separate interest passing and are a charge against each share and against
the Person entitled thereto. Estate of Chesney (1905) i Calif. App. So, 81 Pac.
679; see (1918) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 1055. The executor is required to pay
merely for convenience. See Jackson v. Tailer (1903, Sup. Ct.) 41 Misc. 36,
38, 83 N. Y. Supp. 567, 568. But the testator may direct that the tax be paid
out of the general assets and exempt a particular devise or bequest from pay-
ment. Kingsbury v. Bazeley (9o8) 75 N. H. 13, 7o Atl. 916. But this was not
done in the present case, which is in accord with authority in holding that the
property-passed by will and hence is subject to the tax.
TAXATION-INHERTANCE TAx oN FOREIGN REALTY--"EQuITABLE CONVERSION."
-The testatrix, domiciled in Iowa, left personalty and realty in Iowa and realty
in Nebraska. To pay the bequests, which exceeded the value of the personalty,
the executor sold part of the realty in Nebraska with the permission of the pro-
bate court of that state. The state of Iowa sought to tax the proceeds of this
sale as part of the personalty passing by the will, under the doctrine of "equitable
conversion." The executor opposed the tax on the ground that the proceeds not
having been brought into Iowa were beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Held,
that the state could tax such proceeds. In re Sanford's Estate (1919, Iowa)
175 N. W. 5o6.
The doctrine of "equitable conversion" is a fictional outgrowth of the maxim
that equity considers that done which ought to be done. See Connell v. Crosby
(1904) 210 Ill. 380, 390, 71 N. E. 359, 354; cf. (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 783.
Being a rule of equity it should not be invoked to work inequity. On this
theory it has been repudiated, even where its acceptance would benefit the state
in which the court was sitting, as opening the way for double taxation. See
Matter of Estate of Swift (1893) 137 N. Y. 77, 86, 32 N. E. io96, io98. And it
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has also been refused application merely to subject property to taxation. See
McCurdy v. McCurdy (igo8) 197 Mass. 248, 250, 83 N.. E. 88r, 882. It would
seem that the doctrine should not be invoked by an owner under contract to sell
in order to exempt him from prosecution for unlawful use of the land or from
liability for injuries resulting from its negligent condition. See In re Baker's
Estate (191o, Surr. Ct.) 124 N. Y. Supp. 827, 828. If this be because the prose-
cution is an action at law, then logically in every case where suit is necessary
to collect the succession tax the doctrine cannot be invoked in favor of the state.
And courts which repudiate the doctrine so hold. Matter of Estate of Swift,
supra; cf. Connell v. Crosby, supra; see Ross, Inheritance Taxation (1912) par.
54 But Iowa provides for enforcement of the tax by action at law. Supp. 1913,
Code of Iowa, sec. 1481 a 17. In the present case the property was subject to tax
in Nebraska as well as in Iowa. But it would seem that the Iowa tax could be
defeated by the legatees (if sui juris) electing to take the land and thus prevent-
ing the conversion. Legatees have such a power of election. Huber v. Donoghue
(i8gi, Ch.) 49 N. J. Eq. i25, .23 Atl. 495; see Mellen v. Mellen (1893) 139 N. Y.
210, 220, 34 N. E. 925, 928. If the doctrine is not universally applied, and the
rule of the instant case is sound, the result may be double, single, or no taxation,
depending on the law of the situs and the forum; if it is universally applied, or
universally repudiated, the result is single taxation. But it is to be remembered
that the courts of the situs have the power to disregard the rulings of the court
of the domicil on equitable conversion, by ruling independently on an instrument
purporting to have that effect, and thereby effectively re-regulating the succes-
sion. Clarke v. Clarke (igoo) 178 U. S. i86, 2o Sup. Ct. 873. Should the law of
the situs thus effectively refuse to recognize such conversion, it is hard to find
justice in a tax laid by the domicil as if on personalty. If such tax is to be
sustained, it should be by reference to and incorporation of the admittedly con-
trolling law of the situs. This fact, together with the fictional nature both of
the doctrine itself and of the rule mobilia sequuntur personam, lends much reason
to the view that "it was never intended by the law to tax a theory having no
real substance behind it." See Matter of Curtis (I894) i42 N. Y. 219, 223, 36
N. E. 887, 888.
ToRTS-CvIL CONSPIRACY-PHYsICIANs&-The defendant members of a medical
association, an organization which no physician professing an exclusive system of
medicine could join, agreed among themselves not to assist the plaintiff, an
osteopath, in surgery. The plaintiff prayed that the defendants be enjoined from
carrying out the agreement. Held, that an injunction should not be granted,
since the defendants acted in good faith and with no intent to injure the plaintiff.
Harris v. Thomas (ig2o, Tex.) 217 S. W. io68.
The weight of authority holds that there is no such thing as a civil action for
conspiracy. But an action for damages caused by acts resulting from a formed
conspiracy is allowed. Cf. Jones v. Monson (igog) 137 Wis. 478, 1i9 N. W.
179; cf. Bowen v. Matheson (1867) 96 Mass. 499. It has been held that unless
the acts which the conspirators combined to do would be tortious if done by one
of them, they do not -become tortious by reason of the conspiracy. Green v.
Davies (i9o5) 182 N. Y. 499, 75 N. E. 536; Porter v. Mack (rpoI) 5o W. Va. 581,
40 S. E. 459; see (1916) 25 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 248. There is a tendency among
modern legal writers to contend that there is a tort of conspiracy, and that the
conspiracy itself is the gist of the action. See Burdick, Conspiracy as a Crime
and as a Tort (907) 7 Coi. L. R y. 229; (igo8) 8 ibid., 117; Charlesworth,
Conspiracy as a Ground of Liability in Tort (I920) 36 LAw QUART. REV. 38.
However, there would seem to be very little reason or authority to back up this
theory. Ordinarily the only difference between the civil "liability" for acts
done in pursuance of a conspiracy and for acts of the same character done by a
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single person is in the greater probability that such acts where done by many
in combination will cause injury. See Toledo, A. A. & N. M. Ry. v. Pennsyl-
vania Co. (1893, C. C. N. D. Oh.) 54 Fed. 73o, 739. This is illustrated by the
analogy of cases of nuisance. One wheelbarrow standing in a street may cause
no injury, but fifty standing there probably will. Cf. Thorpe v. Brumfitt (1873,
Eng.) 8 Ch. 65o. Thus it would seem that the only legal effect of a conspiracy
is the aggravation of damages caused by the acts done in pursuance thereof.
The ijastant case may further find support on the ground that the defendants
weie justified in their action, even had they intended injury to the plaintiff, there
being still question whether in law osteopaths are physicians. See Keiningham v.
Blake (i919, Md.) xog Atl. 65 (code section denying to municipal officers author-
ity to accept birth or death certificate from osteopath sustained). Probably the
same situation would maintain as to a chiropractor. See (i9i8) 28 YAI. LAw
JouRNAL, 97; but see ibid., 615.
ToRs-I=IxAL ACTS-VoLATION OF SUNDAY LAws.-The plaintiff and the
defendant were hunting together on Sunday in violation of a state statute. Mis-
taking the plaintiff's hat for a squirrel, the defendant shot and injured the
plaintiff. The plaintiff sued for damages. Held, that the plaintiff should recover
without proof of negligence, since the shooting was a voluntary, unlawful act.
White v. Levarn (19i8, Vt.) io8 AtI. 564.
In order that a violation of a statute may operate to afford a right to damages,
the violation must be the proximate cause of the injury. Lindsay v. Cecchi
(1911) 26 Del. 133, 8o Atl. 523; Dervin v. Frenier (1917) 91 Vt. 398, Ioo AtL
76o. The question of causal connection is determined to some extent by con-
sidering what causal acts the statute was intended to prevent. Cf. Bourne v.
Whitman (1911) 2o9 Mass. 155, 95 N. E. 4o4; cf. Hyde v. McCreery (1911) 145
App. Div. 729, 13o N. Y. Supp. 271. The statute forbidding hunting on Sunday
is obviously not intended to prevent injuries from hunting accidents, but to
provide peace and quiet on Sunday. PFlat v. Cohoes (1882) 89 N. Y. 219. It
has been hela that where a plaintiff's cow was run over by a train running on
Sunday in violation of a statute, the plaintiff should not recover without proving
negligence, the violation of the statute not being the proximate cause of the
accident. Tingle v. Chicago etc. Ry. (1882) 6o Iowa, 333, 14 N. W. 320. Where
a violator of a Sunday law was injured by the negligence of one not a violator,
the violation has generally been-held not such a contributing cause of the injury
as to preclude recovery. Sutton v. Wauwuatosa (1871) 29 Wis. 21; Louisville
etc. Ry. v. Frawley (1886) xio Ind. 18, 9 N. E. 594; contra, Beachem z. Ports-
mouth Bridge (i895) 68 N. H. 382, 40 Atl. io66; Day v. Highland St. Ry. (1883)
135 Mass. 113. The minority doctrine has been changed by statute in Maine and
Massachusetts. Me. Rev. St. 19o3, ch. 84 sec. 131; Mass. Rev. Laws, 19o2, ch. 98,
sec. 17. If an act done in violation of a Sunday law is denied to be, for that
reason alone, a legally effective cause of an injury which follows it in cases where
the Sunday violator is a plaintiff seeking redress for a tort inflicted on him while
he was violating the law, it is hard to see on what principle a precisely similar act
can acquire the character of legally effective cause, for its illegality alone, merely
because the actor is a defendant. Cf. Hughes v. Atlanta Steel Co. (igii) 136 Ga.
511, 71 S. E. 934; cf. Gross v. Miller (1894) 93 Iowa, 72, 6z N. W. 385. The
theories of causation and the public policies involved are identical in the two
cases. And a conclusion which thus distinguishes between culpable and contribu-
tory causation in illegal acts is doubly hard to understand because of the ordinary
rule of in pari delicto. The Vermont court has already held that the fact that
the plaintiff was working on Sunday in violation of a statute, did not bar recov-
ery for a tort arising from the defendant's negligence. Hoadley v. International
Paper Co. (899) 72 Vt. 79, 47 Atl. i6g. It had indeed previously held that one
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traveling on Sunday in violation of a statute could not recover for an injury
caused by a defective bridge. Johnson v. Irasburgh (1874) 47 Vt. 28. But there
the court admitted the violation of the Sunday statute was not the proximate
cause of the injury, and placed the decision on the ground that the right to
recover from a town for a defective bridge was one conferred by statute and
thus subject to statutory limitations and that the Sunday law was, in effect, such
a limitation on the right to damages. It is submitted that a sound determination
of the instant case would have been based on the evidence of the negligence of
the two parties. See Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action (1914) 27 H~av.
L. REV. 317, 339.
WILus-APEA FRO PRDoT---INr=aEST OF CoTESTAT.-The testator by his.
will devised to his widow the same estate which she would have received by
statute if he had died intestate. The other portion of his estate he devised to
his two brothers with remainders at their death to certain nephews and nieces.
Two executors were named, and the will was probated by them. The widow, as
the sole complaining party, filed an appeal from the order of probate, and con-
tested the will on the grounds of testamentary incapacity and undue influence.
The proponents moved to dismiss the appeal because the contestant had no in-
terest in the estate that entitled her to contest the will. Pending the motion the
widow amended her appeal, and based her right to contest the will on the
grounds, first; that she was deprived of her statutory right, either to qualify as
the personal representative of the decedent or to name the personal representa-
tive, and, second, that by a prior will she was devised a life estate in all the
testator's propery. Held, that the appellant should not have the relief asked,
because she had not proved such an interest as "entitled" her to contest the
will. Egbert v. Egbert (i92o, Ky.) 217 S. W. 365.
It seems settled that a legatee or devisee under a prior will is "entitled" to
contest a later will in order to establish his rights. Crowley v. Farley (1915)
x29 Minn. 46o, 152 N. W. 872; see In re Wynn's Estate (1916) 193 Mich. 223,
226, 159 N. W. 492, 493. But, in the principal case, the court held that the appel-
lant did not sufficiently allege that the prior will was still in existence and
unrevoked. Under statutes a proceeding to contest a will can generally be
maintained only by a "person interested" or by one "aggrieved" at the time
the will is admitted to probate. The interest must be a direct pecuniary interest
affected by the probate of the will. See Crowell v. Davis (1gg, Mass.) 123 N. E.
611, 612. Any person thus interested may contest the validity of the will. Kin-
naman, v. Kinnaman (188o) 71 Ind. 417. Where a widow takes the same estate
under the will as the statute awards her in the event of her husband's intestacy,
she takes by descent and not by purchase. Thompson v. Turner (igo9) 173 Ind.
593, 89 N. E. 314, Ann. Cas. i912A 740, note. There does not seem to be a
jurisdiction contrary to the doctrine of the principal case, that the mere privilege
and power to administer in the event of intestacy is not a sufficient interest to
contest the will; and it seems that all the adjudications are cited in the opinion.
